In this study, I analyze Bitcoin transaction data and build an economic model on Bitcoin traders incentives to decompose the Bitcoin price into a utility-driven compo- The preliminary results show interesting patterns of trading and pricing in the Bitcoin market for the first time.
I. Introduction
"Bitcoin became a buzzword overnight. A cyber-enigma with an enthusiastic following, it pops up in headlines and fuels endless media debate. You can apparently use it to buy anything from coffee to cars, yet few people seem to truly understand what it is. This raises the question: Why should anyone care about bitcoin?" - Vigna and Casey (2015) , The Age of Cryptocurrency Bitcoin has attracted worldwide attention and triggered heated debate among economists (Surda (2012) , Yermack (2013) , Harvey (2014) ). It is an example of the so-called cryptocurrency that is first proposed by Satoshi (2012) . The Bitcoin is not pegged to any metal or major currency, and has no collateral or sovereign credit to justify its value. However, its exchange rate with respect to US dollars soared to $1,124 on November 30 2013 and is still around $500 until the point when this report is written, even after multiple national agencies announced its invalidity as a currency.
There are basically two views with regard to whether the Bitcoin serves as a currency.
Classical finance theory says that a currency must have value and it defines the value of an asset as the present value of the sum of discounted cash flows that asset distributes. For example, the common stock of a company ABC is a contract that promises to distribute periodic dividends which depends both on the details of the contract and on the performance of the company. If the company ABC made it clear that it will never distribute dividends, then the common stock of ABC with no voting rights would worth nothing. In other words, an asset that does not distribute any cash flow should have a zero value. It is the case for Bitcoin, so the antagonists claim that the frenzy over Bitcoin is purely a bubble.
Nevertheless, Bitcoin did serve as a medium of exchange when in actual use or circulation. In this sense, it resembles the primitive currencies that any economy ever used before central bank was founded. What it lacks is the creditworthiness granted by the central bank. This argument doesnt invalidate classical finance theory since the Bitcoin promises to distribute itself if it were acknowledged as a currency. Recursive as it is, the statement can never be resolved without looking into the real utility it brings to the economy. Therefore, the protagonists argue that the intrinsic value of Bitcoin comes from its circulation as a medium of exchange to create the trading opportunities for otherwise disconnected individuals. The lack of guarantee should not be a concern as long as the majority of participants are willing to use it.
Intuitively, the price of Bitcoin should reflect both the bubbling part and the intrinsic value part. This study, as the first step of a bigger project, intends to learn both parts through its detailed transactions. Conceivably, the role Bitcoin plays in the capital market is time-varying. It depends on the fact that how many participants want to trade it as a medium of exchange or hold it until price surges. In other words, whether Bitcoin is more like a currency or a bubble relies on the cross-sectional distribution of trading incentives of all participants at that moment. In this paper, I build a model that extends the LDA (Latent-Dirichlet-Allocation) model developed in Blei, Ng, and Jordan (2003) to estimate the proportions of different types of trading incentives in order to decompose the Bitcoin price into a utility-driven component (value), a speculative component (bubble), and a friction component (spreads). I then look into major headline news to see how information or rumor affects the different components of the Bitcoin price.
II. Methodology

A. Model
The aggregate Bitcoin market is governed by a time-series of macro variables. The macro variables summarize the sentiments in the market and the relative weights of traders with different incentives. I use a vector θ t to denote the (unobserved) relative weights and it also determines the relative proportions of different components comprising the Bitcoin price.
In the model, there are three components of the Bitcoin price. First, V alue t is the intrinsic value, or the utility part of Bitcoin as a medium of exchange. Second, Bubble t is the bubbling component, or the frenzy part of Bitcoin price. Finally, F riction t is (the value for reducing) the trading friction which is measured by the price impact that affects things like trading costs (or transaction fee) and searching costs. All three parts are measured in terms of the price (or exchange rate) of Bitcoin with respect to US dollars P t . In other words, θ t is proportion to the vector of (V alue t , Bubble t , F riction t ) with P t as the normalizing factor.
I also assume that there is a vector of time-invariant attributes associated with each individual trading account. Similar as above, I use a i to denote the unobserved incentives of trading for address i absent from macro market-level sentiment. Correspondingly, the vector of a i denotes the individuals incentive to trade as a utility-driven trader, a speculator and an exchange (Harris (1995) ), which contribute to the three price components mentioned above.
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The first type, the utility trader, consumes and saves Bitcoin as a means of payment or a medium of exchange, and thus defines the intrinsic value of Bitcoin. The second type, the speculator, always wants to buy low and sell high in order to make more profit. They dont make profits by trading very frequently, instead, they might make big bets and have the incentive to brew and ride a bubble to later cash out. The last type, the exchange, facilitates trades and provides trading opportunities to make the market more liquid. They make profits by charging implicit fees for their services for bridging counterparties. The fees also cover their potential opportunity loss for not being able to hold more Bitcoin when the price rises and have to hold more when the price falls. Their service contributes to (the reduction of) frictions in the Bitcoin market.
At time t for an individual trader i, the unobserved trading incentive mixture p it is jointly determined by the market sentiment θ t and individual attribute a i . Intuitively, when an individual initialize a transaction, she might both derive non-monetary utility from it and make some monetary profit at the same time, and her trading might also create the opportunity of trading for others who trade with her. Therefore, the trading incentive mixture p it describes the mixture of the role an account i is playing in a transaction tx at time t. The trading incentive mixture further determines the realized trading incentive z it,tx for the trader i at time t in a specific transaction tx.
Given z it,tx , the realized trading strategy f it,tx follows a multinomial distribution, with the distribution of strategy conditional on trading incentives summarized by a matrix ϕ.
The observed trading strategies f it have multiple features, including connectivity, trading intensity, trading size and profit. Intuitively, exchanges will trade with many parties in one transaction, while speculators execute trades in order to make profits. Therefore, I put a strong prior belief on ϕ and parameterize the belief by β. Here, β gives the pseudo-count of observing a specific type of trader adopting a specific trading strategy.
To reduce the number of parameters to estimate, I put priors on the market sentiment θ t and individual attribute a i , denoted by α and ξ respectively. The joint distribution is thus defined by the set of conditional dependences summarized in Table I and the graphical model is given in Figure 1 .
One caveat of the model is that I leave the network structure uncaptured. In the model I simply aggregate the number of addresses an individual trades with/against in a specific transaction.
B. Estimation
I explore a paralleled Gibbs Sampling method on the collapsed state space to do parameter estimation. Similar to the original LDA model, the focus is to estimate the three components of θ t , which determine the price decomposition for Bitcoin. This can be achieved by collapsing the probability state space to be conditioned on as in Foulds, Boyles, Dubois, Smyth, and Welling (2013) .
Since the state space is discrete and large, I follow the traditional steps to derive a collapsed Gibbs Sampling method and distribute the learning algorithm over multiple processors. After observing the realized strategies f we have the following posterior distributions
Recall that z it is the realized type of incentive for trader i at time t, z ¬it is the realized types for (1) z ¬i,t , another trader j = i at same time t, (2) z i,¬t , same trader i at another time τ = t, and (3) z ¬i,¬t , different trader j = i at different time τ = t. Note that observing z ¬i,¬t is not helpful to learn the distribution of z it , so the conditional distribution of z it in Eq 1 is irrelevant of z ¬i,¬t . N f is the f -th row of the frequency matrix of observing a trader with incentive k = 1, 2, or 3 playing strategy f , while N ¬it f is the frequency excluding counting the current trader i at time t. To calculate the first component in the above equation, note that
where p(z it |a i , θ t , φ) ∝ θ t α i with representing the element-by-element product. The posterior distributions p(a i |z i,¬t , f ) follow the Dirichlet distributions with the k-th compo-nent equal to ξ (k) + #(z i,¬t = k) and α (k) + #(z ¬i,t = k) respectively. To sum up, the collapsed Gibbs Sampling has the following form
Again, the N t is the t-th row of the frequency matrix of observing a trader with incentive k = 1, 2, or 3 participating at time t, and N i is the i-th row of the frequency matrix of observing the trader i realized to have incentive k = 1, 2, or 3.
Finally, I explore a parallel version of the above sampling method, for which I sort all trades according to trader id first and then block id. In this case, I split the whole dataset into 200 small datasets each containing all the trades but for only a portion of traders.
After getting the estimates on each small dataset, I perform the global update using a reduce-scatter operation following the strategy proposed in Newman, Asuncion, Smyth, and Welling (2009) .
In the equations above, p represents the p-th processor which contains only the p-th small dataset. In each iteration, the global counts N f k and N tk are copied to each local counts N f k|p and N tk|p and get updated in a distributed fashion. After that, the increments in local counts are gathered together to update the global counts more efficiently. purchase. In all, there are 11, 000 strategies and I put strong priors on the matrix of β such that a speculator always has high realized profits and an exchange is always involved in trades with lots of counterparties.
III. Data
The price decomposition is simply a rescale of θ t given the current exchange rate of Bitcoin to U.S. dollars. Therefore we have
IV. Preliminary Results 1 Silk Road was operated as a Tor hidden service such that online users were able to browse it anonymously and securely without potential traffic monitoring. It was called the "Amazon.com of illegal drugs" or the "eBay for drugs", though it also sold dozens of other categories of merchandise. It was shut down by FBI on October 2013, and in November 2013 it was reported that Silk Road 2.0 was online and being run by former administrators of Silk Road. occurred targeting an anonymous user and the well-known Bitcoin exchange Mt. Gox.
The fear of insecurity quickly moved the circulation value of Bitcoin, and the function of Bitcoin exchange was doubted as reflected in (the value of) the friction component. Since the first attack, the volatility (or variation) of the friction component also grew continuously.
In April 2012, the first government agency report on Bitcoin was released by FBI and triggered heated discussion in the Bitcoin circle. Doubts on the role of big Bitcoin exchanges further brought down (the value of) the friction component and increased its volatility. Judging from the graph, the suspicion is that tighter government scrutiny followed unreported, with Bitcoin exchanges facing increasingly intense attacks every second.
During the same time, however, the use of Bitcoin was more widely accepted as the Euro-zone sovereign-debt crisis spread. It was recognized by Cyprus, Spain, and some other Euro-denominated countries as a substitute for their national currencies. The wide acceptance can be validated by the rise in speculation and utility-driven components.
Starting from the fourth-quarter of 2013, Bitcoin was also recognized by more big online entities such as Baidu. On the contrary, the U.S. government imposed stronger online intervention and shut down all illegal online platforms such as Silk Road. It was rumored that Chinese government would also step to calm down heated Chinese Bitcoin market, and the news quickly affected the utility-driven component. It bounced back soon as the news turned out fake and the speculative component reached historical high. At the end of the sample period, two more big attacks occurred and the resulting victim Mt. Gox was driven out of business by the end of Feburary 2014, leaving more and even more fluctuating frictions.
V. Related Work
Despite the revolutionary idea of crypto-currency, there are still very few studies in finance and economics (Surda (2012) , Yermack (2013) , Harvey (2014) ). On the other hand, the infrastructure, the security, the transaction network, and the legality of the Bitcoin have intrigued many research topics in the field of computer science, data science (Babaioff, Dobzinski, Oren, and Zohar (2012) , Barber, Boyen, Shi, and Uzun (2012) , Ron and Shamir (2013) , Eyal and Sirer (2014) ) and law (Grinberg (2011) ). In reality, while entrepreneurs found new ventures (eg. 21 Inc.
2 ) servicing Bitcoin trading, practitioners and policy makers are still in a heated debate of how it will shape the future of business trading and even the financial markets. To my best knowledge, this paper is the first one to bridge the gap between the studies of crypto-currency in different fields. It proposes a economic/data-science model that intends to answer the fundamental question of the legitimacy of Bitcoin as a currency.
There are three main areas that the paper is related to. First, the economic framework extends those in traditional theoretical and empirical finance by incorporating the bubbling component directly. It also extends traditional behavioral finance model by putting the rational, irrational, and friction parts into a unified framework and estimating them using a panel data simultaneously.
Second, this paper also proposes a new method to conduct market microstructure study using big data. As far as I know, it is the first paper to propose a hierarchical statistical model on the whole distribution of trading accounts, instead of using various bottom-up features which might be subject to overfitting problem due to overuse of limited information of observed data. The proposal of mixed-trading-type model is novel and also more natural to capture complicated trading incentives for individuals exposed to different market sentiments.
Finally, the paper extends the prototype LDA (Latent-Dirichlet-Allocation) model which is widely used in natural language processing and information retrieval. I derive a paralleled collapsed Gibbs Sampling method and use it to perform the decomposition of Bitcoin price.
VI. Conclusion
To conclude, this study builds a novel economic model to decompose the Bitcoin price into a utility-driven component, a speculative component, and a friction component. I use the detailed transaction data to estimate the incentives of trading behind each trade.
The economic model extends the classical LDA model, and I perform a paralleled Gibbs Sampling method to learn the realized incentives on a collapsed state space.
The experiment shows that the speculative component dominates the Bitcoin price since
Chinese buyers flooded in. Furthermore, since the first attack in the Bitcoin market, the volatility of the friction component has increased over time. Regardless of closer scrutiny and tighter regulations, Bitcoin gets recognized by many major online markets and considered as a substitute currency for some Eurozone countries. For this reason, both the utilitydriven component and the speculative component climbed quickly during the past two years.
As the first step to analyze the Bitcoin market using detailed transaction data, this project leaves us many interesting questions that I hope to address in future research. To sum up, the existing Bitcoin market provides us a perfect example to address lots of fundamental questions in the research of finance. At the same time, the methods for the analyses are deeply rooted in the academic achievements in computer science during the past twenty years. I hope to advance the research in the intersection of the two areas to accommodate our knowledge to the ever-changing world of business.
Table I Notation and Conditional Dependencies
This table gives the definition and conditional distribution assumptions of the variables used in the model. The interrelationship among these variables can be found in Figure 1 . Figure 2 gives the time series of the estimated log of price components. The blue line shows the utility-driven components. The red line shows the speculation components. The green line shows the friction components. The shaded areas with labels 1 to 13 represent the quarters with corresponding news that are given in Table III . Black arrows represent conditional dependency. Red arrows represent determinant dependency. Yellow shaded areas represent "good" news quarter, while gray-shaded areas represent "bad" news quarter. 
